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COMMENTS
NEVER MARRY A RICH MAN: THE LESSON OF
BEAM v. BANK OF AMERICA', A CALIFORNIA
APPORTIONMENT CASE
Never marry a rich man. This advice to any prospective
bride is required by present California community property law
because marriage to a wealthy man will not necessarily afford her
with financial security after termination of the marriage. For ex-
ample, a husband and wife married for over a quarter of a cen-
tury may enjoy a luxurious standard of living. Yet on dissolution
of the marriage, the wife may find herself penniless. The Cal-
ifornia community property system must be amended to protect
the wife of the wealthy man and to preclude this anomalous re-
sult.
California2 and seven3 other states 4 maintain statutes and
promulgate judicial decisions classifying property owned by hus-
band and wife as community property; that is, it belongs to both
spouses equally." The objective of the community property sys-
tem is to promote the economic security of the family members
both during the marriage and after its termination.6 In Califor-
nia, upon termination of a marriage, either by death or dissolu-
tion, the assets of the spouses must be characterized as either
separate 7 or community property.8  Characterization is necessary
1. 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971), afjg Beam v.
Beam, 10 Cal. App. 3d 973, 89 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970).
2. The principle statutes now defining the system are partly in the Civil
Code and partly in the Probate Code. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4516-18,
4525-03, 4800-5138 and CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201-03, 228-30.
3. Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washing-
ton. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 1 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAKI.
4. "Actually there is no community property 'system.' Each of the eight
traditional community property states . . . has by statutes and judicial interpre-
tation evolved its own set of legal rules." Clark, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN NEW MExico, 26 TUL. L. REV. 324 n.1 (1952).
5. DE FUNIAK § 1; The relevant California statute provides, in part: "The
respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during con-
tinuance of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal interests.
." CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105 (West 1970).
6. H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNA COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY 3 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as VERRALL].
7. Separate property is defined as all the "property owned by the spouse
before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or
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if one spouse has died because the surviving spouse is entitled to
one-half of the community assets; the other half is subject to tes-
tamentary disposition by the decedent. If termination is by judi-
cial process, dissolution or legal separation, the court must divide
the community property equally between the parties. 10
Presumptions have been devised to aid courts in character-
izing assets as separate or community property. The basic pre-
sumption is that all property acquired during the marriage is com-
munity property.'1 The reason behind this rebuttable presump-
tion is to ensure the achievement of the basic goal of the com-
munity property system: the equal distribution of property ac-
quired during marriage to provide protection for the parties after
the marriage is terminated. However, this goal has been under-
mined consistently through judicial application of another pre-
sumption, the family living expense presumption.'" This requires
a court to charge all family living expenses against the community
property upon termination of the marriage. The court's applica-
tion of this presumption may deny the wife her proper share in
the community assets. The most recent case applying the family
living expense presumption in this manner is Beam v. Bank of
America." This comment discusses the validity of the Beam de-
cision in light of the present goals of the California community
property system.
RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY-IN BRIEF
Traditionally, under the Spanish-Mexican system of com-
munity property from which all modern community property stat-
utes were derived, 4 the fruits, rents, and profits of separate prop-
descent, with rents, issues, and profits thereof.... .CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 5107-
08 (West 1970).
8. "All other real property situated in this state and all other personal
property wherever situated acquired during the marriage . . . is community
property. ... CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970).
9. "Upon the death of either husband or wife, one-half of the community
property belongs to the surviving spouse; the other one-half is subject to testa-
mentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to the
surviving spouse ..... " CAL. PROD. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
10. "The court shall . .. divide the community property . . .of the par-
ties equally...." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
11. See Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116, 264 P.2d 626
(1953); DE FUNIAK § 60 and cases cited therein.
12. In re Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1962); In re Estate of Arstein, 56 Cal. 2d 236, 364 P.2d 33, 14 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1962); Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal. 2d 784, 167 P.2d 708 (1946); Title Insurance
v. Ingersol, 158 Cal. 474, 111 P. 360 (1910); In re Estate of Ney, 212 Cal
App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1963).
13. 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971).
14. DE FUNIAK § 1.
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erty were classified as community property. 15  Idaho,' 6 Louisi-
ana,17 and Texas"8 retain this view. The first California legisla-
tion dealing with this topic followed the Spanish law, 19 but the
provision was subsequently declared unconstitutional 0 in George
v. Ransom." Therefore, California 2 and four other community
property states23 now provide that fruits, rents, and profits of
separate property remain separate.
Having deviated from the Spanish system which favors the
community, the California Supreme Court in In re Estate of Cud-
worth24 recognized the peril for the wife in California's commun-
ity property system:
In nearly all other civilized countries marriage immedi-
ately vests in the wife some estate in the property owned by
the husband at the time of marriage; but such is not the law
here, and if he chooses, as in the case at bar, to afterward do
nothing except to collect his rents and profits, he may, after
a long period of faithful wifehood, leave her penniless. Her
only chance to acquire by marriage any interest in property
is to marry a man who has nothing, with the hope that he
may afterwards earn something in which she will have a
community right. 25
Protection by Apportionment
In order to protect the wife and to alleviate the peril en-
visioned in Cudworth, the courts2" have devised numerous for-
15. DE FUNIK § 71; VERALL at 158.
16. IDAHO CODEANN. § 32-906 (1963).
17. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2334, 2386, 2402 (Slovenko 1950). However, a
wife may stipulate by notarized written instrument that she reserves such fruits,
rents, and profits as her separate property.
18. TEX. CONST. art. 16 § 15; TEx. FAMILY CODE §§ 5.01, 5.21, 5.61
(1969).
19. "The rents and profits of the separate property of either husband or
wife shall be deemed common property." Act of 1850, ch. 103, § 9, [1850]
Cal. Stats. 254 (declared unconstitutional 1860).
20. The decision has been criticized because the court relied on common
law interpretation of "separate property" rather than appropriate Spanish com-
munity property principles. Decisions such as this are characteristic of com-
mon law misconceptions of the meaning of community property. See DE FUNIAK
§ 71.
21. 15 Cal. 322 (1860).
22. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-08 (West 1970).
23. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.130
(1961); N.M. STATS. ANN. §§ 57-3-4, 57-3-5 (1955); WASH. REV. CODE §§
26.160.010, 26.160.020 (1961).
24. 133 Cal. 462, 65 P. 1041 (1901).
25. Id. at 469, 65 P. at 1044.
26. Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Cal. 2d 77, 271 P.2d 489 (1954); Huber v.
Huber, 27 Cal. 2d 787, 167 P.2 708 (1946); Pereira v. Pereira, 146 Cal. 1,
103 P. 488, 23 L.R.A.(n.s.) 880 (1909); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 215 Cal. App.
1972]
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mulas to apportion the gains between the husband's separate es-
tate and the community. This apportioning is necessary only
when the skills of the husband, a community resource, are com-
bined with his separate assets to produce business profits. Prof-
its will be apportioned entirely to the husband's separate estate
only when they are attributable solely to the natural enhance-
ment2 7 of the separate property or when the husband has expend-
ed minimal effort while the wife has offered no evidence as to the
value of the husband's services." In other words, the duty is upon
the wife to show the value of the husband's services.
29
Once it is determined that the doctrine of apportionment of
business profits is applicable, the next step is to determine which
method of apportionment should be used.
The Pereira Rule. The first decision apportioning profits in
a community property state was Pereira v. Pereira0 in which the
California Supreme Court apportioned proceeds from the hus-
band's separately owned cigar store-saloon. The Court held that
unless the contrary could be shown, it must be presumed that the
property investment was responsible for part of the profits, and
that this share would amount at least to the reasonable interest
rate on a long-term investment. This holding has been inter-
preted to mean that interest on a capital investment should be
credited to the separate estate and that the remaining profits are
attributable to the husband's efforts, skills, and services and
should be credited to the community.8
The Van Camp Method. Van Camp v. Van Camp3" es-
tablished another method of apportionment. In this case, the
husband was the controlling shareholder of a large corporation
and devoted his efforts exclusively to the management of the busi-
ness. The court held that although the husband's salary belonged
to the community as reasonable compensation for his services, all
the dividends were the husband's separate property. The reason-
2d 140, 30 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1963). Theoretically, apportionment of business
profits also should be made if the separate property belongs to the wife rather
than to the husband. However, no case apportioning profits from the wife's
separate property to the community has been noted.
27. In re Estate of Cudworth, 133 Cal. 462, 468, 65 P. 1041, 1044 (1901).
28. Cozzi v. Cozzi, 81 Cal. App. 2d 229, 232, 183 P.2d 739, 741 (1947).
29. It should be noted that the rules of apportionment apply not only
when the husband owns a separate business, but also when the husband invests
his separate funds in real estate or securities. Margolis v. Margolis, 115 Cal.
App. 2d 131, 251 P.2d 396 (1952); Witaschek v. Witaschek, 56 Cal. App. 2d
277, 132 P.2d 600 (1942).
30. 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488, 23 L.R.A. (n.s.) 880 (1909).
31. In re Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745 (1962); Tassi v.
Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872 (1958).
32. 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
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ing underlying the Van Camp decision and its progeny is the pre-
sumption that a greater share of profits is allocable to separate
property because a greater proportion of the profits usually de-
rives from the separate resources rather than from the husband's
time, skill, and labor. The use of the Van Camp formula usually
means that the community is credited with that proportion of the
profits derived from the husband's services and the balance is
credited to the separate property of the husband. 8
The Tax Formula. The tax formula of apportionment is
used less often than the Pereira or Van Camp formulas. This
formula was adopted in the California case of Todd v. McCol-
gan. 4 The court there estimated a fair return on a capital in-
vestment and added to this amount a reasonable salary for the
owner's services. This sum serves as the denominator. In order
to determine the community share, a fraction is formed by using
the reasonable salary as the numerator. This fraction is then
multiplied by the total profits. The product derived is the
amount which is to be credited to the community. The share of
the separate estate is determined by using the fair rate of return
as the numerator (the denominator remaining the same) and
again multiplying the fraction by the total profits. For example,
assume that a fair return on capital is $6,000, that a fair salary
for the husband's efforts is $12,000, and that the actual profits
of the business are $12,000. By the tax formula of apportion-
ment, 6/18 of the profits, or $4,000, would be allocated to the
husband's separate property. The community property would re-
ceive 12/18 of the profits, or $8,000.
A good summary of these formulas is presented in Logan
v. Forster.8" In Logan, the district court of appeals indicated
that a court was not bound to any one test but that the court
must consider all of the circumstances in order to "achieve sub-
stantial justice between the parties"8 6 before determining which
apportionment formula to apply.
In re Estate of Neilson,87 however, has cast doubt on the
flexible rule of Logan. Citing Pereira, the opinion stated that the
usual "rule" of apportionment of profits is to allocate a fair re-
turn on the investment to the separate property and to credit any
33. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 297 P.2d 769 (1955); Huber v.
Huber, 27 Cal. 2d 784, 167 P.2d 708 (1946); Tassi v. Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d
680, 325 P.2d 872 (1958).
34. 89 Cal. App. 2d 509, 201 P.2d 414 (1949); this formula has not been
adopted in civil cases, however.
35. 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 250 P.2d 730 (1952).
36. id. at 600, 250 P.2d at 738.
37. 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962).
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excess to the community property as reimbursement for the hus-
band's efforts.
As these cases demonstrate, there is no simple, ideal formula
upon which the California courts have agreed. The problem of
which apportionment formula is appropriate seems to vary inex-
plicably from case to case. Similar confusion regarding appor-
tionment exists in other states3 s which have altered the Spanish
rule on fruits and profits. However, each of those states seems
to favor the community by putting the burden of proof on the
one seeking to establish that some part of the income is separate.39
On the other hand, the California cases generally put the burden
of proof on the party seeking to establish that some part of the
income should be credited to the community.4" Such placement
of the burden of proof is inconsistent with the substantive pre-
sumption that all property acquired during marriage is commun-
ity;4' hence, the wife is afforded no advantage in the characteri-
zation of the assets when the marriage is terminated. Further-
more, even having overcome the perplexities of apportionment,
the wife who seeks characterization of the assets as community
property must still confront the family living expense presump-
tion.
The Family Living Expense Presumption
A long line of decisions42 has established the presumption
that the expenses of the family are paid from community rather
than from separate funds. In the absence of any evidence showing
a different practice, these expenses are charged to community earn-
ings. This presumption applies even when the community earn-
ings are derived solely through application of an apportionment
formula.4"
Application of the presumption has a serious effect on the
characterization of assets upon dissolution of marriage44 since it
38. See Note, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (1963) for a brief comparative
analysis of apportionment in states which have deviated from the Spanish rule
on rents, issues, and profits. See also DE FUNIAK § 72.
39. DE FUNIAK § 72.
40. In re Estate of Ney, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1963);
Cozzi v. Cozzi, 81 Cal. App. 2d 229, 183 P.2d 739 (1947).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970).
42. Cases cited note 12, supra.
43. In re Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1962); In re Estate of Arstein, 56 Cal. 2d 236, 364 P.2d 33, 14 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1962); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 56 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921). This
presumption has evolved even though the earliest apportionment case, Pereira v.
Pereira, made no express provision for the use of a family living expense
presumption.
44. This presumption affects characterization of assets only if the nature
of the funds used to acquire an asset during the marriage is in doubt.
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negates the effect of the basic presumption that all property ac-
quired during marriage is community." If the family living ex-
pense presumption is applied, any asset acquired during a pe-
riod in which the community living expenses exceeded the com-
munity income is presumed to have been acquired by expendi-
tures of separate funds.46 Because the asset acquired assumes the
character of its source,4 7 any asset acquired with separate prop-
erty is separate and not subject to distribution on termination of
the marriage. For example, assume that the character of a cer-
tain $10,000 asset is in dispute upon dissolution. Assume also
that this asset was acquired in an accounting period during which
community income and community expenses were each $50,000.
The law presumes that the community income of $50,000 was
used to meet the family living expense obligations of $50,000.
Since all the community income was expended in retiring family
living expense debts, there was no community income with which
the $10,000 asset could have been purchased. Hence, the $10,-
000 asset is presumed to be separate property and therefore not
divisible on termination of the marriage.
The original justification for the presumption was that the
debts accruing during marriage were for the benefit of the com-
munity and were therefore an obligation of that community.4 s
This fails to consider any possible abuses which may arise be-
cause the husband has the statutory authority to establish the fam-
ily style and mode of living. 49 There also is a statutory require-
ment that a husband support his family and if necessary use sep-
arate funds to do so.5" These statutory grants of authority in-
teract with the family living expense presumption. The result is
that a husband with separate income may establish a style of liv-
ing for the community which may, applying the family living ex-
pense presumption, expend all community income. Once com-
munity income has been exhausted, any assets acquired during
the period are separate and not available to the wife on termina-
tion of the marriage. Such a result is legally permissible. Thus,
the wife finds herself in the frustrating position of having no legal
right to prevent the husband, as manager of the community and
director of the life-style, from incurring community debts which
may obliterate community income.
45. See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
46. See note 56 and accompanying text, infra.
47. In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947); Siberell v. Siberell,
214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932).
48. DE FUNIAK § 159.
49. CAL. Cv. CODE § 5101 (West 1970).
50. CAL. Cv. CODE § 5100 (West 1970).
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The advocates of the family living expense presumption may
argue that the wife benefits when the husband establishes an af-
fluent standard of living and that she does not need title to
assets on termination. However, this argument is invalid in
light of the community property policy of protecting the partners
financially after termination of the marriage." A support order
is not the answer to financial stability for it is a conditional grant
which ceases on the death of the obligor or on remarriage of the
obligee.12  Such conditional payments are an inadequate substi-
tute for the fee title to assets which one would expect a wife with
a present, choate55 interest in property to receive.
Thus, the plight of the "penniless" wife described in Cud-
worth 5 4 is real and substantial under current California law. The
family living expense presumption exists as a mighty protector of
the husband. The husband who owns separate property will be
aided by the presumption in his quest to have assets characterized
as separate upon termination of the marriage. This assistance to
the owner of the separate property is in opposition to the es-
tablished presumption in the statutory law which favors charac-
terization of the assets as community. 5
See v. See5 -A Glimmer of Hope?
Critics of the family living expense presumption 57 applauded
the California Supreme Court decision in See v. See as an at-
tempt to mitigate the hardship of the presumption on the wife
whose husband controlled both his separate and their community
incomes. In See, a divorce case, Mr. See was employed by the
family industries. He was paid a salary for his time, effort, and
skills, and this amount was therefore community income. The
husband had commingled this community asset and his separate
assets in two commercial accounts.
The court did not need to discuss any of the apportionment
cases, for Mr. See's time, effort, and skills were used to produce
actual community property during the course of the marriage.
Apportionment is necessary only when the husband foregoes a
salaried job to manage his separate assets and hence denies the
51. See note 6 and accompanying text, supra.
52. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(b) (West 1970).
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (West 1970).
54. 15 Cal. 322 (1860). See text accompanying note 24, supra.
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970).
56. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
57. See Note, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1180 (1967); Note, 19 STAN. L. REV. 661
(1967); Note, U.C.L.A.L. REv. 935 (1967).
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community of income from his time, effort, and skills during the
marriage.58
Over the wife's objection, the trial court applied the family
living expense presumption and ascertained that because total
family living expenses exceeded the total community income for
the period of the marriage, no assets acquired during the mar-
riage could have been acquired with community funds. The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the family living expense pre-
sumption, which relies on a recapitulation of total community ex-
penses and total community income, throughout the marriage, is
not to be applied in all cases. The court found the presumption
applicable only when, through no fault of the husband, it is not
possible to ascertain the balance of community income and ex-
penditures at the time property was acquired. Hence, the case
was remanded for retrial on the property issues.
On retrial of the property issues, the husband has the burden
of proving that the community expenses exceeded commun-
ity income at the times the assets purchased during the mar-
riage were acquired. If the husband meets this burden the
assets are characterized as separate property and are not
subject to distribution on dissolution of the marriage.59
Justice Traynor's opinion clearly recognized the hardship
that mandatory application of the family living expense presump-
tion would bring:
Automatic application of the family living expense presump-
tion would transform a wife's interest in community property
from a 'present, existing, and equal interest' as specified by
Civil Code section 161a, into an inchoate expectancy to be
realized only if upon termination of the marriage the [total]
community income fortuitously exceeded [total] community
expenditures.6"
Application of the See holding is proper if the husband com-
mingles his separate and community income, if the husband ex-
pends his separate property when community funds are exhausted,
and if the husband "faults" by failing to keep adequate records
regarding asset acquisition so that the character of the asset is in
doubt. If these conditions are present, then the family living ex-
pense presumption based upon total recapitulation for the mar-
riage period will not be applied. As a corollary to the primary
holding, the party who used his separate property for community
purposes is entitled to reimbursement from the community if
there is an agreement between the parties to that effect. If no
58. See note 26 and accompanying text, supra.
59. 64 Cal. at 785, 415 P.2d at 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
60. Id. at 782, 415 P.2d at 779, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
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agreement exists, the amount expended is deemed to have been a
gift to the community. 1
Thus, determination of whether application of the family
living expense presumption is proper depends, along with other
prerequisites, upon whether the party seeking reimbursement has
through "fault" failed to keep adequate records. But what is
"faulty" record keeping? The court in See did not define the
term and indeed it can be interpreted many ways. Consequently,
the ultimate question raised by See is, "What circumstances will
require a court to find 'fault' and to apply the See exception to
the use of the family living expense presumption?"
Summary
Because strict application of the California law which pro-
vides that rents, income, and profits of separate property are sep-
arate may lead to inequitable results, the courts have devised for-
mulas to allocate the profits between community and separate
property. Even when community property is apportioned, there
is a distinct possibility that no assets will be characterized as com-
munity property on termination of the marriage because of the
application of the family living expense presumption. This pre-
sumption assumes that separate property is used to meet family
living expenses only after community assets are totally expended.
See provides an exception to this rule if the partner seeking reim-
bursement from the community funds has committed "fault" in
his record keeping; expenditures of his separate property are then
deemed to be a gift to the community.
BEAM v. BANK OF AMERICA6 2-DEMISE
OF THE WIFE'S PROTECTION
Beam v. Bank of America shows that the See ruling is to be
construed narrowly and limited closely to its facts. The protec-
tion which might have accrued to the wife through liberal appli-
cation of the See ruling has thus been removed by the California
Supreme Court. In Beam, the court held that the ruling in See"3
does not apply to cases where community property is derived by
one of the apportionment theories.64 The opinion reaffirms the
61. Id. at 784, 415 P.2d at 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 893. For a recent de-
cision applying See v. See, see Bare v. Bare, 256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 335 (1967).
62. Mrs. Beam died subsequent to the filing of the appeal and the name of
Bank of America, executor of her estate, was substituted. For convenience and
clarity, the appellant in the action is referred to as Mrs. Beam.
63. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
64. 6 Cal. 3d at 22, 490 P.2d at 264, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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propriety of the family living expense presumption in apportion-
ment cases.
65
Facts of Beam v. Bank of America6
Mr. and Mrs. Beam were married for 29 years; a divorce
was granted in 1968. Prior to and during the marriage, Mr.
Beam inherited approximately $1.6 million in cash and securities.
From 1946 to 1953, these assets were invested in tax-free muni-
cipal bonds yielding a one percent income. Except for brief and
insignificant intervals, the husband was not employed during the
marriage; instead he devoted his time to handling the separate es-
tate and engaging in private business ventures with his own capi-
tal. While Mrs. Beam claimed that the separate assets were
worth approximately $1.8 million at the time of the divorce, Mr.
Beam claimed their worth to be approximately $1.7 million.
Income, rents, and profits from Mr. Beam's separate prop-
erty were the only moneys received and spent by the parties dur-
ing their marriage. The total income and profits, before taxes,
from these investments were approximately $2.4 million. Mrs.
Beam's sole occupation was that of housewife and mother to the
couple's four children and hence her time, effort and skills yielded
no community income. The family living expenses over the en-
tire period of the marriage averaged $2,000 per month. The
family also incurred extraordinary expenses (travel, weddings,
gifts) of $22,000 per year for the last eight years of the mar-
riage. Total expenses for the marriage, were, therefore, $872,
000.
The wife contended that family living expenses were not
chargeable to any apportioned community income resulting from
the husband's time, effort and skills. The trial court disagreed
and held that there was no community property for distribution
on dissolution. The Supreme Court in a unanimous decision af-
firmed the trial court decision.
Automatic Application of the Family Living Expense Presump-
tion Required in Apportionment Cases
The Supreme Court found that apportionment of profits was
clearly required because Mr. Beam's efforts in managing his sep-
65. Id.; The court also decided issues on transmutation of various assets
acquired during the marriage and on the effect of certain gifts on the valuation
of the separate estate. One $38,000 promissory note was awarded to the wife.
This was the total community property estate. These subsidiary issues of the
case are not the subject matter of this comment on the apportionment issue.
66. See also Brief for Appellant at 4-18, Brief for Respondent at 4-9, Beam
v. Beam, 10 Cal. App. 3d 973, 89 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970).
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arate property were more than minimal. Referring to the Pe'reira67
approach and the Van Camp68 formula, the court proceeded to
discuss "two quite distinct, alternative approaches to allocating
earnings between separate and community income.69 While the
"substantial justice" test required in Logan v. Forster" was reaf-
firmed, the court concluded that the trial court's application of
the Pereira rule was not offensive to the Logan doctrine. The le-
gal rate of interest, seven percent, 71 was held to be a reasonable
rate of return and the gains derived from application of this inter-
67. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
68. See note 32 and accompanying text, supra.
69. Beam v. Beam, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137,
141 (1971). No mention is made of the tax formula established in Todd v.
McColgan; see note 34 and accompanying text, supra. The court's statement
also ignores the inherent difficulties which arise upon the use of either of the
formulas. The Pereira formula seems to be best suited to a marriage in
which the spouse's time, effort, and skills are a major factor in producing the
new asset. According to the Pereira formula as interpreted by the courts to
date, after the spouse's separate property is reimbursed, the remaining increase
in value is apportioned to the community. The community property may fall
heir to a large allocation only if the increase in value is greater than the reim-
bursement due to the separate property. This is the fatal flaw of the Pereira
approach. When the marriage has endured for a long period and when the
spouse's separate property is considerable, e.g., the instant case, it seems un-
likely in light of the cyclical nature of the business world that the increase in
value of the separate assets will sustain a growth rate sufficient to reimburse
the spouse's separate estate at the legal rate of interest, i.e., seven per cent.
If the separate property does not increase this seven per cent per year, there
can be no apportionment to the community estate. Intuitively, it seems that the
use of the Pereira formula to such apportionment cases cannot effectuate sub-
stantial protection to both parties after the end of the marriage.
The Van Camp formula is not without its weaknesses. Paradoxically, the
Van Camp formula was designed for use when a reasonable return on the hus-
band's separate property contributed more to the asset's increase in value than did
the husband's investment of time, effort, and skill. It is perhaps this rationale
which has caused the courts applying Van Camp to first ascertain the value due
to the community property and then to apportion the remainder of the increase
in value to the separate estate of the husband.
Potentially, in the Van Camp line of cases, the separate estate stands to
gain the greater allocation of the increase in value, for the allocation to the
community property is fixed at the value of the husband's time, effort, and
skills. While the Van Camp formula ascertains a fixed return to the com-
munity and the Pereira formula allows a variable return to the community, the
use of the former insures that there will be apportionment to the community.
The Pereira formula cannot yield such a result. Inherently, the insurance pro-
vided by the Van Camp formula seems more in line with the basic purpose of
the community property system. It is unfortunate that the court has not yet
critically analyzed these problems of the "two quite distinct, alternative ap-
proaches to allocating earnings between separate and community income."
Beam v. Beam, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 141
(1971).
70. See note 35 and accompanying text, supra.
71. See Justice Brown's dissenting opinion in Beam v. Beam, 10 Cal. App.
3d 973, -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 280, 287 (1970). He criticizes the use of the Pereira
formula in the instant case because Mr. Beam's assets were invested for many
years yielding one percent rather than the seven percent credit given by the
Court's application of Pereira.
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est rate were allocated to the husband's separate property. The
court affirmed the findings of the trial court that the burden of
proof was on the partner seeking to characterize the property as
community and that this burden had not been discharged.
Such application of the Pereira rule in Beam resulted in a
finding that the entire increase in value of the separate estate was
attributable to the normal growth factor of the separate property.
The actual increase in value of the separate estate was less than
the amount which was to be credited to the husband's separate
property through application of the seven percent interest. In us-
ing this seven percent figure as the reasonable interest rate on a
long term investment, the court failed to consider that Mr. Beam
had purposefully chosen, for tax purposes, to invest his estate in
assets yielding only one percent annually. Thus, the court credit-
ed the separate property with seven times the maximum increase
the assets could have earned.
Additionally, the court found that even if it applied the Van
Camp rule of evaluating the reasonable value of the service per-
formed by the husband in the management of his separate estate,
there was still no community property for apportionment. The
annual value of Mr. Beam's services was determined to be one
percent of the corpus of $1.7 million, or $17,000 per year.
Computed over the term of the marriage from 1946 to 1967, the
court found that $357,000 was the amount to be apportioned to
community property under the Van Camp rule.
Having derived an amount of community income, the court
applied the family living expense presumption,72 finding no reason
why it should not be applied. Community expenses for the total
marriage period totalled $872,000 which completely extinguished
the community income of $357,000.
The court held that See did not preclude an automatic ap-
plication of the family living expense presumption in apportion-
ment cases. The fact that the presumption is still valid is shown
in the See opinion in three ways, according to the Beam court.
First, the See decision did not expressly overrule any of the cases
in which the family living expense presumption was used in con-
junction with apportionment cases.
Second, See is distinguishable on its facts. Beam is an ap-
portionment case because Mr. Beam chose to forego a salaried
72. See note 12 and accompanying text, supra. At least one commentator
interpreted See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966) as
repudiating the family living expense presumption completely. B. WrrxIN, SuM-




job and to manage his separate assets. In See, Mr. See expended
his time, effort and skills on a job for which the community was
compensated. Mr. See "elected" or "consciously chose" to use
separate property when community income derived from his sal-
ary was consumed. Mr. Beam, however, did not earn any salary
and did not "choose" between separate income and community
income. The only community income in Beam was derived by
an apportionment formula. Community income derived from ap-
portionment cannot be commingled during the marriage as it is
fictional and not ascertainable nor in legal existence until dissolu-
tion of the marriage. The opinion stated that there was no testi-
mony to rebut the use of the family living expense presumption.
The fact that Mr. Beam testified 3 that he paid all family living
expenses from separate property is insufficient as he testified
based upon the assumption that there was no community income.
Third, the court in See acknowledged that a husband could
prove that an asset purchased during marriage from a commingled
account was separate if at the time of acquisition of the asset the
family living expenses exceeded community income. These three
interpretations implicitly acknowledge the continuing validity of
the family living expense presumption in apportionment cases.
Because the See opinion did not affect the application of the fam-
ily living expense presumption, the Beam court applied it and
found that there was no community property for division between
the husband and wife.
Validity of Beam in Light of See v. See
The Beam court held that See was simply not "in point"74
on the cursory distinction that See dealt with a husband who
"consciously chose" to spend separate funds for community ex-
penses whereas Mr. Beam did not. The essence of the See de-
cision, however, was the finding of faulty record keeping on the
part of the spouse who chose to use his separate property to pay
community expenses. While the See court did not define faulty
record keeping, it did state what was not "fault." The court
there found one such instance where the amount of community
income was not ascertainable until the time of trial. 5 Neverthe-
73. Brief for Appellant at 13, Beam v. Beam, 10 Cal. App. 2d 973,
89 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970) (citing trial court testimony of Mr. Beam).
74. 6 Cal. 3d at 22, 490 P.2d at 264, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
75. 64 Cal. 2d at 783, 415 P.2d at 780, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 872 citing In re
Estate of Arstein, 56 Cal. 2d 236, 364 P.2d 33, 14 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1962) and
In re Estate of Ades, 81 Cal. App. 2d 334, 184 P.2d 1 (1947); However, in
each of these cases, the party to be burdened with the record keeping was
deceased and testimony as to the balances in various accounts would have been
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less, nowhere in the Beam opinion is the issue of fault discussed,
so the Beam court never addressed the keystone of the See opin-
ion.
It is arguable that Mr. Beam's failure to keep records on as-
set acquisitions is a type of "fault" which the See court addressed.
Had the Beam court found "fault" in the apportionment frame-
work, the court would have denied recapitulation of the total liv-
ing expenses of the marriage. Application of the See rationale
would have assured protection to the wife in an apportionment
case. To avoid application of the See rule, the husband destined
for apportionment as well as a husband who has a salaried job
would be forced to keep copious records of all asset acquisitions
and expenditures. A wealthy person's failure to keep records
could fairly be considered "fault." Persons of means commonly
have retained counsel and accountants throughout their business
lives to maintain records. Even without full-time financial advice,
the widespread use of checking accounts and credit cards pro-
vides the purchaser with significant records to overcome the See
doctrine of faulty record keeping.
Assuming that failure to keep records in the apportionment
situation is "fault," See still requires that there be a commingled
account. It is arguable that community income derived from an
apportionment formula cannot be commingled because it is not
in existence at the time of the asset acquisition and is ascertainable
only at the end of the marriage. The whole notion of apportion-
ment is a legal fiction to arrive at substantial justice. Hence, it
is arguable that community property apportioned at the end of
the marriage can be considered "fictionally commingled" with
separate property for purposes of meeting the commingling re-
quirement of See.
Having ignored the issue of "fault" in apportionment cases,
the Beam court failed to discuss one of the more crucial require-
ments of the See decision. By distinguishing Beam on the facts,
noting that Mr. See had actual salary and that Mr. Beam had only
that "imputed" community income characterized by an appor-
tionment formula, the Beam opinion negates any positive effect
that See might have had on California apportionment cases.
Summary
See held that, where fault exists, a husband may not be re-
imbursed for expenditures of separate property used to meet fam-
impossible to obtain. The facts of these cases make them clearly distinguishable
from dissolution cases, and hence, the estate cases should not be controlling.
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ily living expenses unless there is an agreement between the par-
ties allowing such reimbursement. The Beam opinion makes it
clear that the family living expense presumption is unaltered by
See and that the See case is not controlling in apportionment
cases. Therefore, a husband in an apportionment case may use
the family living expense presumption to offset family living ex-
penses, regardless of "fault" and without an agreement allowing
such a reimbursement.
The crucial distinguishing fact between the Beam and See
cases, according to the Beam court, is that Mr. See "consciously
chose" to use his separate property while Mr. Beam did not make
such a conscious choice. However, there can be no conscious
choice until the property is apportioned between the separate and
community estates at the end of the marriage. Beam thus holds
that in apportionment cases no conscious choice to use one's sep-
arate property can exist and the See case is not controlling.
The decision in Beam assumes that the husband did not
know that his time, effort, and skills would necessitate an ap-
portionment of income to the community at the end of the mar-
riage. Thus, contrary to traditional jurisprudence which pre-
sumes that a man knows the law, this decision assumes that the
husband is ignorant of the law. Because he is ignorant of the
fact that community property will be apportioned on dissolution,
the husband could not have "elected" to use separate funds as
Mr. See did. The ignorant husband is thus rewarded in Beam,
and need not comply with the requirements of the See decision.
Attorneys who have carefully read Beam can now counsel
their wealthy male clients that they are protected from the See
doctrine. The attorney can advise a wealthy man to avoid sal-
aried jobs, to spend his time managing his separate assets, and to
consciously increase family living expenses, which will be pre-
sumed paid from any community property apportioned when the
marriage is terminated. Hence, the husband will be reimbursed
from the community property without an agreement from the oth-
er spouse and regardless of "fault"-a result seemingly "out-
lawed" in See.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The persistence demonstrated in the Beam opinion for the
family living expense presumption necessitates certain changes in
California community property law to give additional protection
to the wife. The system as it exists unduly burdens the wife of
a wealthy man who chooses to manage his separate estate and to
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deprive the community of its most likely source of increase-the
husband's salary.
Statutory Amendment
The most direct means of affording protection to the wife is
to amend the statutes to change the existing method of character-
izing assets. A repeal of that portion of the Civil Code which
establishes fruits, profits, and income of separate property as sep-
arate property accompanied by enactment of a section reflecting
the original Spanish-Mexican system would be a good means of
protection for the wife who marries a wealthy husband. Such a
statute might read:
Rents, fruits, and profits of either spouse's separate
property are community property belonging to both
spouses by halves; separate property is defined as pro-
perty owned by the spouse at the time of marriage or
thereafter acquired by gift, devise, or descent.
This change would eliminate the complexities of apportion-
ment as the wife would derive her interest by statutory grant.
However, such a drastic change to the community property sys-
tem is not expected. Furthermore, although such a statutory
change would negate the problems of apportionment, it would not
completely protect the wife from the adverse effect of the family
living expense presumption. Therefore, to provide the wife with
maximum protection, a method of allocating the family living ex-
penses must be devised which achieves a more equitable result
than the family living expense presumption. Such a method
might be called the "family living expense allocation."
The Family Living Expense Allocation
According to present community property principles, the
husband may choose the family mode of living 0 to blend with
tastes he has acquired as a wealthy, unmarried man. The total
living expenses may bear no realistic relationship to the standard
of living which actual community income would dictate. Justice
Traynor was aware of this problem when he created the See ex-
ception to the automatic application of the family living expense
presumption. 7 However, the Beam court made it clear that the
See exception does not apply to apportionment cases so that au-
tomatic application of the family living expense presumption is
required.
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 (West 1970).
77. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d at 785, 415 P.2d at 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
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A simple solution to the adverse effect of the family living
expense presumption on the wife's share of the community in ap-
portionment cases would be the application of a pro rata method
of charging expenses against the separate and community assets. 8
The use of such pro rata distribution which could be labelled the
"family living expense allocation" would negate the need for the
family living expense presumption. In addition, a pro rata sys-
tem of allocation is simple to apply. A court on dissolution of
marriage need ascertain only the total living expenses for the mar-
riage, the total separate property at dissolution, and the total com-
munity property derived from apportionment or from other sour-
ces. For example, in Beam, the total family living expenses were
$872,000, total separate property was $1.7 million, and total
community property by apportionment was $357,000. Adding
the separate and community property values and using this num-
ber as the denominator, the separate property value is used as a
numerator. This fraction is then multiplied by the total living
expenses which gives the amount of the living expenses charge-
able to the separate property. Similarly, the community property
value is used as a numerator to establish the living expenses to be
borne by the community property. Such a formula would charge
the community in Beam with approximately $151,000, leaving
$206,000 for equal distribution on dissolution. Approximately
$721,000 would be charged to the $1.7 million separate estate.
A system of pro rata allocation such as the "family living
expense allocation" would not be new in California. Such a sys-
tem has been used in probate administration to divide expenses of
administration 9 and family allowances8 ° between separate and
community estates and in divorce proceedings to allocate alimony
(to a former wife) and child support payments8' between the two
types of property.
78. Although an allocation could be made by charging community expenses
against separate income and community income, allocation against assets is a
superior method. Income, especially for the wealthy person, can be greatly
affected by various tax planning devices, e.g., investment in tax free municipal
bonds as in the instant case.
79. In re Estate of Coffee, 19 Cal. 2d 248, 120 P.2d 661 (1941); "[T]he
portion of the community property which belongs to the wife is the one-half
which remains after the payment of the husband's debts and expenses of ad-
ministration apportioned between the community and separate property in ac-
cordance with the value thereof ... ." Id. at 252, 120 P.2d at 664.
80. In re Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. 2d 375, 79 P.2d 443 (1938);
"[We are aware of no argument that can be made for exonerating the separate
property of the deceased from bearing at least its pro rata share of both of these
[debts, family allowance] and of the expenses of administration." Id. at 381-82,
79 P.2d at 447. Haselbud thus shows the variance between treatment before
death, i.e. the family living expense presumption, and soon after death, i.e.
pro rata allocation.
81. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 432 Cal. Rptr. 13
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Summary
California law should be changed to reflect a policy of great-
er protection to the wife who marries a wealthy man. The stat-
utes could be amended to provide that rents and profits from
separate property are community property thus avoiding the ne-
cessity of apportionment. A better resolution of the problem
would be for the courts to adopt a "family living expense alloca-
tion" system in place of the family living expense presumption.
Such an allocation would charge living expense ratably to the
separate and community property.
CONCLUSION
The family living expense presumption as affirmed in Beam
works a harsh burden on a wife who seeks economic security upon
dissolution of marriage from a wealthy husband who has man-
aged his separate estate. The "family living expense allocation"
of family living expenses is more equitable and is simple to com-
pute. Unlike the family living expense presumption, a system
of pro rata allocation is consistent with the presumption that all
property acquired during marriage is community property and
with the community property policy of protecting both parties of
the marriage after dissolution. Furthermore, and most important,
the "family living expense allocation" will aid the courts in ef-
fectuating fair, just, and equitable results upon dissolution of mar-
riage.
Kenna J. Helms*
(1967); "An apportionment of defendant's alimony and child support obliga-
tions between his separate income and the community income is both practical
and fair. Defendant's total separate and community income during the period
of his second marriage should be used to determine the proportionate amounts
that his separate and community property will be charged [on dissolution of his
second marriage]. Id. at 564, 432 P.2d at 712, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
* The author wishes to thank Paul J. Goda, S.J., for his helpful sugges-
tion in the research and writing of this comment. The author also wishes to
thank Warner B. Berry, attorney for Mrs. Beam, for his assistance in the re-
search of this paper.
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